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Over the past few years, the Gulf of Guin-
ea has been increasing its world share of 
oil production. At the same time, armed 
robbery and piracy attacks have become a 
permanent threat to the maritime agents in 
the region. Oil theft, crew kidnapping for 
ransom and robbery of crew and ship val-
uables are the most common outcomes of 
successful attacks.  
To better understand the phenomena, a 
political, economic, social and environ-
mental analysis of the region was per-
formed, and a geographic information sys-
tem was developed to provide a deeper 
analysis and understanding of the correla-
tion between geographical and scope fac-
tors of this criminal activity, considering 
the period from January 2012 to May 
2015. The system integrates the land and 
maritime boundaries, population, religion, 
oil/gas platforms, oil/gas fields, reported 
attacks on ships and spatial analysis re-
sults. 
Several factors are pointed out as major 
contributors to today’s maritime criminality 
in the Gulf of Guinea. The geographic in-
formation system analytical outputs pro-
vide a view of the geographical concentra-
tion, trends and perceive a slow decreas-
ing of this threat until 2014 and a slow 
growing tendency in 2015. 
Keywords 
Gulf of Guinea; maritime piracy; maritime 
assaults; shipping; oil.  
1. Introduction 
The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) is a maritime 
natural resources rich environment, both 
live and mineral. Its strategic value is 
growing proportionally to its oil and gas 
production, and fishing is also not to be 
neglected.  Over the last few years, the 
shipping and fishing activities have been 
under piracy (outbound the territorial sea) 
and armed robbery assaults (inbound the 
territorial sea limits). To deal with these 
illicit activities several national, interna-
tional and multinational strategies have 
been designed. To better understand the 
maritime criminality problem of the GoG, 
and decide on the best lines of action to 
take, a geospatial analysis of the area and 
its maritime criminality was performed us-
ing a COTS geographic information sys-
tem (ArcGIS). The piracy and armed rob-
bery assault data was acquired from the 
monthly IMO reports on acts of piracy and 
armed robbery against ships, from Janu-
ary 2012 until December 2014 and from 
the US Navy Office of Naval Intelligence 
worldwide threat to shipping reports from 
January to May 2015.   
2. The Golf of Guinea 
The GoG comprises a geographic area 
that goes from Cape Verde and Senegal 
in the north along the West African coast 
down to Angola in the south. For the pur-
pose of this paper only the littoral coun-
tries were considered: Cape Verde, Sene-
gal, Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Si-
erra Leone, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Ghana, 
Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroons, Equato-
rial Guinea, S. Tomé & Príncipe, Gabon, 
Republic of the Congo, Democratic Re-
public of Congo and Angola. These coun-
tries are members of several organizations 
that have been discussing the security of 
the GoG, namely the African Union, the 
Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), the Economic Communi-
ty of Western African States (ECOWAS) 
and the Gulf of Guinea Commission 
(GGC). 
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The GoG area shipping (Halpern & Wal-
bridge, 2008) follows two major routes. 
One goes down to the Cape of Good 
Hope and around Africa (outbound) and 
the other follows the coast of the GoG 
countries and dissipates as it reaches Ni-
geria (fig. 1). The GoG maritime routes to 
Europe and the USA are of great value for 
there are no chokepoints between their 
coasts, and sailing distances are shorter 
than the ones to the Middle East great oil 
producing countries. These factors are 
major in transportation costs and security 
attractiveness. 
 
Fig. 1: GoG shipping, 2005 
The maritime illicit activities are to be dealt 
differently according to littoral countries 
sovereignty and jurisdiction areas. All GoG 
countries have signed the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS sets a 
maximum width of the territorial sea to 12 
nautical miles from the base lines, Togo 
still claims a width of 30 NM and Benin a 
width of 200 NM (fig. 2). This fact has im-
plications in the classification of maritime 
illicit activities such as piracy or armed 
robbery assaults, and in the way an event 
can be dealt with by local authorities and 
the international community.  
 
Fig. 2: GoG maritime boundaries 
The Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 
the GoG litoral countries sums up 3.3 mil-
lion km2, first ranking Cape Verde, Angola 
and Equatorial Guinea. The territorial seas 
add about 208 thousand km2 and the con-
tinental shelf claims, so far presented to 
the United Nations, represent an area of 
about 1.1 million km2. 
In 2014 the GoG littoral countries sum up 
about 287 million people (fig. 3), repre-
senting about one third of the African’s 
continent. Nigeria is at the same time the 
most populated and the country with the 
highest population density (CIESIN & 
CIAT, 2005). 
 
Fig. 3: Population (millions) 
In 2014, the gross domestic product 
(GDP) was highest in Nigeria (1058 million 
$), followed by Angola (175,5) and Ghana 
(109,4) (fig. 4). 
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Fig. 4: GDP, 2014 
Equatorial Guinea ($32.600) and Gabon 
($21.600) had the highest GDP per capita, 
between 2,5 and 4 times higher than An-
gola ($8.200), the third in rank (fig. 5).   
 
Fig. 5: GDP per capita, 2014 
In 2013 Africa produced 10.1% of world’s 
oil and 6.0% of gas (British Petroleum, 
2014). Africa’s proven reserves of oil and 
gas represent 7.7% and 7.6% of the 
world’s, most of them located in the GoG 
area. In 2013 Nigeria produced a daily 
average of 2322 thousand barrels of oil 
and Angola reached 1801 (fig. 6). These 
figures and the fact that there are no major 
international conflicts between GoG coun-
tries have led several analysts to flag a 
growing strategic role of the GoG in the 
energy market. Also, the grade of GoG oil 
is very good. Crude oil is evaluated ac-
cording to its sweetness (sulphur content) 
and weight (API gravity degree). The best 
value for money from crude oil distillation 
is achieved from sweet and light oil. GoG 
oil is sweet and light.  
 
Fig. 6: Oil fields & production, 2013 
For oil and gas production, in 2009, there 
were 801 fixed platforms off the GoG 
countries (Saldanha Bay IDZ, 2012, p. 
15), and it is expected that this number is 
higher today. Pipelines and floating units 
are used to store and transport crude and 
gas from the platforms to terminals and to 
shore. In 2014, 37 of the world’s 151 oil 
floating production storage and offloading 
units were operating in the GoG. To dig 
new wells, the offshore oil and gas indus-
tries use rigs. In 2014, the GoG rig fleet 
was of about 100 vessels and platforms, 
which had a utilization rate of 65%. Alto-
gether it is a very significant and expen-
sive infrastructure. 
Some authors refer that, in the GoG coun-
tries, only political and economical nation-
al leaders have been benefiting from the 
oil and gas industries (Fidelis Allen, 2012), 
implying that the revenues have not been 
applied to the common social, economic 
and environmental policies. According to 
the Resource Governance Index (Reve-
nue Watch Institute, 2013), Nigeria (40th), 
Angola (41st) and Republic Democratic of 
Congo (44th) have “weak” natural re-
sources revenues governance scores 
while Cameroons (47th) and Equatorial 
Guinea (56th) are considered to be “failing” 
in their revenues governance. Only Ghana 
(15th) and Liberia (16th) have a classifica-
tion of “partial satisfactory” (fig. 7). No 
GoG country is classified in the “satisfac-




Fig. 7: Resource Governance Index 
International, regional and local criminal 
activities are intrinsically related with the 
incapacity of states to make and/or en-
force their laws. This was clear when So-
malia government collapsed and maritime 
piracy went off the roof. The fragile states 
index is published annually and it ranks 
the world countries regarding their col-
lapse probability (Fund for Peace, 2014). 
This index takes into account, among oth-
er indicators, the demographic pressure, 
group grievance, uneven development, 
poverty and economic decline, human 
rights and security apparatus. The political 
reality in the GoG is generally evaluated 
as fragile due to regime challenge or in-
stability, generalized poverty and high lev-
els of criminality. In the GoG countries 
there are five that figure within the 20th 
most fragile states in the world. Democrat-
ic Republic of Congo is the 4th most frag-
ile, being included in a set of countries in 
very high alert. Guinea, Ivory Coast and 
Guinea-Bissau are in the high alert list and 
Nigeria, in the 17th place, is in the simple 
alert list (fig. 8).  
 
Fig. 8: Fragile states index 
Among the GoG countries, Angola is the 
one with the most uneven development, 
followed by Equatorial Guinea and Nige-
ria. Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Sierra 
Leone are the ones with more poverty. 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea and Nigeria are the worst evaluat-
ed considering human rights. 
Despite its richness in natural resources, 
the GoG area is experiencing maritime 
safety and security problems that might 
affect future investments in the oil and gas 
industries. Security in the GoG is a major 
problem, namely due to ship robbery, kid-
napping or host taking and oil theft. 
The number of piracy and armed robbery 
attacks in the GoG, from 2012 until May 
2015, reached a total of 172 (fig. 9), in 
many of which hostages were taken. In 
2013, the GoG piracy and armed robbery 
assaults estimation of primary economic 
costs to stakeholders were between $565 
million and $681 million (Oceans Beyond 
Piracy, 2014, p. 55). These numbers still 
differ significantly from the 2013 Somali 
piracy economic costs that were estimated 
between $3.000 million and $3.200 million 
(ibidem, p. 7). 
 
Fig. 9: Piracy and assaults 2012-
2015(May) 
The shipping industry is not completely 
innocent in the GoG criminality schemes. 
Some crews also participate in irregular 
activities selling some unaccounted oil for 
private benefit, or transferring stolen oil 
from the black to the clean oil market. For 
this reason, some attacks are not reported 
to authorities and the official maritime re-
lated crime numbers are considered con-
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servative. 
The GoG is an area of open waters in the 
Atlantic, and attacks to ships are mainly 
made inside or near the countries’ territo-
rial seas, when they are anchored or slow 
moving. In Somalia, attacked ships and 
their whole crew are taken for ransom and 
can be held hostage for very long periods 
of time, sometimes years. In the GoG, 
criminals select high value crew members 
(i.e. the captain and the head of engineer-
ing) and take them to land for ransom. 
Ships are not held for more than a few 
days, just enough to transfer the oil into a 
ship enrolled in the black market or to a 
store site ashore. Attackers in the GoG 
are more violent than in the Indian Ocean. 
They also are very well armed and have 
some capability to directly fight law en-
forcement authorities. 
When analyzing the maritime illicit activi-
ties in the GoG there are two major ena-
blers: the limited authority capabilities of 
coastal states and the resources govern-
ance. The first includes limited coopera-
tion between states, limited maritime situa-
tional awareness and limited navies and 
coast guards capabilities. The latter in-
cludes all the factors that affect fragile 
states, corruption and low natural re-
sources revenue transparency. 
The problems that arise from the maritime 
illicit activities can be grouped in five dif-
ferent areas: illegal, unreported and un-
regulated fishing that damages local 
economies and contribute to the degrada-
tion of natural resources sustainability; 
environment degradation by toxic waste 
dumping; trafficking & smuggling of drugs, 
arms and people; damaging of the oil & 
gas infrastructures for oil theft, specially 
pipelines (which is also a source of major 
inland and near shore oil spills); and ship-
ping that is affected by robbery, crew kid-
napping for ransom, oil theft and oil smug-
gling that is sold to the oil black market.  
Data mining and analyzing the GoG piracy 
and armed robbery assault database one 
can verify that attacks are more frequent 
from February to September (fig. 10). 
 
Fig. 10: Attacks “years by months” 
Considering the maritime areas where the 
172 attacks occurred, 88 took place inside 
the countries’ territorial or interior waters 
(33 in 2012, 23 in 2013, 23 in 2014 and 9 
in 2015) and 84 outside. Of all these at-
tacks, 65 were attempts that for some rea-
son had no consequences on ships, their 
crew or cargo (fig. 11). 
 
Fig. 11: Success of attacks 
The worst types of attacks are the ones 
that include kidnapping, injuries or the 
death of crew members, hijacking a ship 
and stealing its cargo. Other minor conse-
quences include stealing ship and crew 
valuables, temporary taking of hostages 
and the destruction of material, normally 
the ship’s communication systems. One 
attack may include more than one type of 
consequences. The majority of successful 
attacks is focused in stealing ship valua-
bles (46) and crew valuables (32). Ship 
hijacking occurred 18 times and 8 attacks 
resulted in the death of crew members 
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(fig. 12), 7 of which occurred in Nigerian 
waters. 
 
Fig. 12: Attacks outcome 
The number of attacks to ships that had 
major consequences has fallen down in 
the period between 2012 and 2014 (18, 
12, 9), but by May 2015 the number of 
these occurrences was already 7, reflect-
ing a tendency to increase. 
Of all GoG maritime attacks to ships, 
about 46% (79) occurred in the Nigerian 
EEZ, territorial sea or interior waters. Most 
of these attacks occurred in the Lagos 
anchorage site or between the two major 
oil and gas exploring areas off the Bayelsa 
state (fig. 13).     
 
Fig. 13: Attacks in Nigerian waters 
In order to better understand the geo-
graphic tendencies of the attacks, a spa-
tial density analysis was performed for 
each year and also the whole period from 
2012 until May 2015. 
Figure 14 shows the density analysis of 
the attacks in 2012. The highest concen-
tration is in the Togo anchorage off Lomé, 
followed by the Nigerian waters offshore 
Bayelsa and the Ivory Coast anchorage of 
Abidjan, the Nigerian anchorage of Lagos 
and the Congolese anchorage of Point 
Noir. 
 
Fig. 14: Density of attacks in 2012 
In 2013 the highest density of attacks oc-
curred on the waters off the Nigerian 
Bayelsa state, followed by the Togo an-
chorage of Lomé and the Nigerian an-
chorage of Lagos (fig. 15). The figures at 
Abidjan and Point Noir anchorage sites 
didn’t change much from the previous 
year. 
 
Fig. 15: Density of attacks in 2013 
In 2014 two areas presented very high 
concentration of attacks: the Point Noir 
anchorage site and the waters off the Ni-
gerian state of Bayelsa (fig. 16). The La-
gos anchorage site presents a lower, but 
still noticeable, value. 
 
Fig. 16: Density of attacks in 2014 
In 2015 (January to May) the higher con-
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centration of attacks took place at the La-
gos anchorage site and the waters off the 
Akwa Ibom Nigerian state, near the border 
with the Cameroon, where there is a very 
large number of oil and gas industry infra-
structures (fig. 17). 
 
Fig. 17: Density of attacks in 2015 
Considering the period from 2012 to May 
2015, the density of attacks analysis 
shows that the hotspots of the GoG piracy 
and armed robbery assaults are four an-
chorage sites (Abidjan, Lomé, Lagos and 
Point Noir) and the waters off the Nigerian 
state of Bayelsa (fig. 18). 
 
Fig. 18: Density of attacks 2012-2015 
One of the major concerns related to oil 
theft is that at some point in time the Is-
lamic group Boko Haram, which terrorizes 
the north of Nigeria, could be able to get 
control of some parcels of land in the 
south and finance its activities with oil. 
This would lead to a different scale of in-
security in the region and the establish-
ment of links with other terrorist organiza-
tions. Figure 19 shows the Boko Haram 
attacks in the period between 2009 and 
2013, as well as the piracy attacks off Ni-
geria in the period 2012-2015. In the 
background one can also see the domi-
nant religion in the different areas of the 
GoG (Muslims, Christians and Tribalists). 
The map shows a very big geospatial gap 
between the locations where the two dif-
ferent types of attacks occur. Also it is vis-
ible that, at this time, Boko Haram has a 
particular focus on Nigerian states of Mus-
lim religion and that the Christian states 
represent a geospatial break in its territo-
rial activities.  
 
Fig. 19: Terrorism & piracy 
3. Conclusions 
The strategic value of the GoG is growing 
due to its richness in natural resources, 
especially oil and gas. For the last few 
years, the shipping activity in the GoG has 
been targeted by piracy and armed rob-
bery assaults. 
There were 172 reports of piracy and 
armed robbery attacks in the GoG in the 
period from 2012 until May 2015. About 
38% of these attacks didn’t result in any 
damages to ships, their crew or cargo. 
The number of attacks has decreased be-
tween 2012 and 2014. In 2015 it is notice-
able an increasing tendency, especially in 
attacks that resulted in ship hijacking, 
crew kidnapping or cargo stolen. Crew 
members died in eight attacks, seven of 
which occurred in Nigerian waters. The 
number of piracy attacks (outbound the 
territorial seas) and armed robbery as-
saults (inbound the territorial seas) is very 
similar (84/88). 
The spatial distribution and density analy-
sis of the attacks show that the anchorage 
sites of Abidjan, Lomé, Lagos and Point 
Noir and the waters off the Nigerian state 
of Bayelsa are the hotspots for the GoG 
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maritime criminality. 
The illicit maritime activity in the GoG has 
the main objectives to steal the cargo from 
tankers, to sell it in the oil black market, 
and to kidnap high valued crew members 
for ransom. 
The geospatial gap between Boko Haram 
attacks and maritime attacks is very big. 
This gap suggests that, for the time being, 
there is no connection between the two 
phenomena. 
The use of a geographic information sys-
tem for the GoG maritime criminality anal-
ysis was very useful to discover both tem-
poral and spatial patterns and tendencies 
of the attacks. 
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